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Abstract
Background: Rationing and allocation decisions at the clinical level – bedside rationing – entail complex dilemmas
that clinicians and managers often find difficult to handle. There is a lack of mechanisms and aids for promoting
fair decisions, especially in hard cases. Reports indicate that clinical ethics committees (CECs) sometimes handle
cases that involve bedside rationing dilemmas. Can CECs have a legitimate role to play in bedside rationing?
Main text: Aided by two frameworks for legitimate priority setting, we discuss how CECs can contribute to
enhanced epistemic, procedural and political legitimacy in bedside rationing decisions. Drawing on previous work
we present brief case vignettes and outline several potential roles that CECs may play, and then discuss whether
these might contribute to rationing decisions becoming legitimate. In the process, key prerequisites for such
legitimacy are identified. Legitimacy places demands on aspects such as the CEC’s deliberation process, the
involvement of stakeholders, transparency of process, the opportunity to appeal decisions, and the competence of
CEC members. On these conditions, CECs can help strengthen the legitimacy of some of the rationing decisions
clinicians and managers have to make.
Conclusions: On specified conditions, CECs can have a well-justified advisory role to play in order to enhance the
legitimacy of bedside rationing decisions.
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Background
Bedside rationing and clinical ethics committees
In publicly funded health services there is a need to ra-
tion healthcare as claims on healthcare exceed available
resources. Many countries have set up systems and in-
stitutions, such as the UK’s NICE, to promote fair pri-
ority setting. Less work has been done on bedside
rationing – the practice of making rationing and alloca-
tion decisions close to patients, typically by practicing
clinicians themselves. Important dilemmas arise in bed-
side rationing; however, in practice, clinicians might
not be aware of priority setting principles or mecha-
nisms for promoting fair bedside rationing, and might
lack support from managers, guidelines, legislation, and
politicians for the difficult rationing decisions that
sometimes have to be made [1].
Clinical ethics committees (CECs) have been pro-
posed to be of some value in mitigating both these defi-
ciencies [2]. CECs are multidisciplinary committees
tasked with increasing clinician awareness of ethical
problems and solutions in their workday and with pro-
viding deliberations and advice on difficult clinical-
ethical problems. CECs have long been features of
many hospitals in the Western world. Recently it has
been argued that CECs might also play several con-
structive roles in issues concerning priority setting, re-
source use and bedside rationing [2].
Legitimacy in rationing: two theoretical frameworks
However, problems of bedside rationing often have a
special feature that distinguish them from other clinical-
ethical problems. As bedside rationing issues concern
scarce resources, the outcome is of relevance to further
stakeholders than the actors directly involved, especially
when the decision requires resources that could have
been spent differently. For a resource driving outcome
to be legitimate, therefore, more than the assent of the
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clinicians and patient directly involved is required. There
is then a question whether CEC deliberations about
issues of bedside rationing can contribute to the legitim-
acy of processes conducted and conclusions reached.
Thus we ask: What does it take for the CEC to be a le-
gitimate actor in bedside rationing dilemmas in the
hospital?
Limit-setting decisions in health carried out on a
population level can be subjected to regulations by spe-
cific criteria for just allocation of health care. However,
as pointed out by Daniels and Sabin [3], we cannot
expect people to agree on what specific criteria or prin-
ciples should be applied to promote justice in these deci-
sions. Rather, we must ensure that the way the criteria
or principles are reached – the decision-making pro-
cesses – are such that people perceive them as fair and
legitimate. The procedural approach that Daniels and
Sabin advocate, ‘Accountability for Reasonableness’
(A4R), stresses the importance of transparency and ac-
countability. This framework consists of four procedural
conditions that are necessary for the outcome of priority
setting processes to be legitimate: “transparency about
the grounds for decisions; appeals to rationales that all
can accept as relevant in meeting health care needs
fairly; and procedures for revising decisions in light of
challenges to them”; and in addition, there must be insti-
tutions in place to enforce the previous three require-
ments [3].
When subjected to this kind of regulating process, the
decisions that are the outcomes of the process can be
justified as legitimate. However, the kind of rationing de-
cisions Daniels and Sabin have in mind are those con-
cerning patient groups, not individuals.
Clinical priority setting decisions about individual
claims on healthcare (‘bedside’) can also be perceived
as indirectly subject to similar conditions of procedural
justice, as clinicians are expected to comply with
evidence-based clinical guidelines when there is no
obvious reason to consider them irrelevant for the case
at hand. The development of evidence based clinical
guidelines inevitably relies upon normative consider-
ations [4–7] which can – and should – also be sub-
jected to accountability. Norheim has developed a
framework wherein the acceptability of processes of
development of guidelines are evaluated, and where
guidelines themselves are considered as tools for prior-
ity setting [8, 9].
Evidently, clinical guidelines cannot provide conclusive
guidance on every clinical decision that has to be made.
For instance, while emergency department triage is
guided by principles, decisions ultimately rely on discre-
tionary considerations of how these principles apply to
the particular cases at hand. Sometimes there might be
reasons to deviate from guidelines by providing or
limiting care and the choice whether to do so constitutes
a dilemma. At other times there are conflicting views as
to whether existing guidelines apply or not. In such situ-
ations, what can make decisions legitimate?
To shed light on this question, Bærøe developed a
framework to complement the A4R framework [10].
This approach was inspired by the identified lack of
transferability of legitimacy from macro-level decisions
about claims of patient groups to micro-level claims of
individuals [11]; the contextual conditions for making
ethical judgments do not coincide. Based on analyses of
the concept of a ‘healthcare claim’ and of clinicians’
scope of responsibility respectively, as well as an appre-
ciation of the theoretical grounding of A4R, the frame-
work details conditions for legitimacy for clinical
decisions with priority-setting consequences at the
micro (bedside) level. Together, the A4R and Bærøe’s
approach can be seen as mutually supporting account-
able and legitimate decisions throughout a publicly
funded healthcare system.1
A role for CECs in bedside rationing?
Against this backdrop of two theoretical approaches to
what makes rationing decisions legitimate we will ex-
plore the role of CECs in such decisions. We focus on
situations of choice that have implications for priority
setting/resource allocation and rationing and where the
decision-makers are healthcare personnel (or managers)
with the discretion to make judgments about bedside ra-
tioning. We make one crucial assumption: CECs do not
have the mandate to make bedside rationing decisions,
only to assist in decision-making. There can be different
reasons for this. For example, it is not practical that
others than those who are responsible for the overall
care are delegated this responsibility, and CECs have not
originally possessed any particular competence that
would make them better suited to carry the political
mandate of distributing health care. The question is then
to what extent these committees nevertheless have the
potential to influence the overall legitimacy of these
decisions.
After setting out the seven criteria for legitimacy in
Bærøe’s framework we present two empirical, real world
priority setting dilemmas wherein CECs were involved,
outlining six roles CECs played in the two cases and
might play in priority setting cases in general. In order
to reach general conclusions with relevance across par-
ticular settings, we then discuss the legitimacy of these
roles rather than the particular cases in question. For
1The roles of CECs which we are about to discuss can of course be
relevant in a private payer or private insurance system also. However,
we centre our discussion around publicly funded systems where calls
for bedside rationing are likely to be more frequent.
Magelssen and Bærøe BMC Medical Ethics           (2019) 20:97 Page 2 of 8
these roles to be considered legitimate in lack of any
particular, formal decision-making authority, they will
have to be assessed according to requirements address-
ing the broader picture of both macro- and micro-level
requirements for fair priority setting in general. Bærøe’s
framework is a response to exactly this complex, general
challenge as it addresses the overall legitimacy of the
implicit priority setting taking place on the micro-level
under influences of macro-level decisions. Therefore,
when being without any formally assigned authority, the
roles of CECs in contributing to bedside rationing will
have to be subjected to at a minimum the same require-
ments of legitimacy as clinician/managerial bedside deci-
sions. With Bærøe’s normative framework as the
backdrop we then discuss whether and how CECs by
fulfilling the six roles contribute to the legitimacy of the
decisions reached. Leaning up on Ives and colleagues’
recently published consensus-based standards of practice
for empirical bioethics [12], we acknowledge the require-
ment for unpacking and openly exposing how the inte-
gration of empirical findings and normative arguments
takes place within this piece of empirical bioethics work.
Also, we will clarify the fundamental epistemic assump-
tion for this approach.
Based on a diversity of empirical cases, Magelssen
et al. identified several roles that CECs play in bedside
rationing under the normative aim of considering their
practical, productive contribution. However, such ‘posi-
tive’ roles might not be justified as ‘legitimate’. In order
to make further normative judgements about ‘legitim-
acy’, the relevance of these roles is therefore assessed
according to a normatively more broadly construed
ethico-political framework of ‘legitimacy’. By doing this,
we assume a constructivist approach to what tasks CECs
can be justified or not in carrying out; our understand-
ing of the ‘should and should not’ is socially constructed.
Moreover, when translating theoretical work into a field
of practice, we assume the epistemic requirement of
establishing empirical knowledge to allow sound conclu-
sions [13].
Main text
Reasonable clinical judgments and aspects of legitimacy
Bærøe’s framework for reasonable clinical judgments
with priority-setting consequences consists of six re-
quirements on clinicians and one requirement on the
self-regulation of the medical profession, requirements
that will now be explained briefly. The starting-point is
the recognition that clinicians have dual responsibilities;
towards the patient in front of them and towards the
entire patient population of the health care system
(which shares the same public funding), respectively,
coupled with the call to ensure equal treatment across
individuals and groups (horizontal equity), as well as
justified unequal treatment among individuals and
groups (vertical equity). This leads to four different aims
of justice that surround clinical decision-making in
health:
(a) horizontal equity demanding equal treatment of
cases considered equal within the clinician’s own
patient population
(b) vertical equity regarding discrimination between the
needs of the clinician’s own patients
(c) contributing to vertical equity by unequal treatment
of unequal cases within the whole patient
population of a healthcare system
(d) contributing to horizontal equity by equal treatment
of equal cases within the whole patient population
of a healthcare system.
Reflection on these four aims of justice led to the
framework consisting of seven requirements summa-
rized in Table 1. The framework can appear daunting,
but the gist is not that each clinical decision must con-
form fully to all requirements in order to be legitimate;
rather, the requirements together form an ideal to strive
towards and are helpful in showing how the legitimacy
of decisions might be increased.
These requirements reflect a conceptualization of ‘le-
gitimacy’ in terms of both procedural and epistemic di-
mensions. Requirement 7 underscores the procedural
aspect of the legitimacy of the judgments made by clini-
cians in individual cases; if these conditions are in place,
these decisions can be approved as legitimate. Require-
ments 1–6 all work towards epistemological steering of
the outcome of the judgement towards reasonableness
by specifying what to justify and demands on the justifi-
cation. Requirement 6 explicitly demands a fair-minded
approach for justification. Requirement 3 introduces the
formal claim on impartiality, and reflects that recogni-
tion of the moral equality of stakeholders should struc-
ture the reasoning. Requirements 1–2 and 4–5 all imply
formal issues considered relevant to apply when promot-
ing fair-minded judgements about bedside rationing.
When these requirements are considered in a broader
societal and political context, it becomes clear that the
legitimacy of the normative basis clinicians derive their
justified claims on healthcare on, is not an isolated pro-
fessional concern. Health authorities in a publicly funded
system cannot accept a clinical practice based on what-
ever clinicians would agree among themselves to con-
sider fair, unless this normative basis also resonates well
with general, accepted political principles for distribution
within society at large. To ensure this to happen requires
taking into account input from other stakeholders than
the clinicians themselves. This brings in a broader, polit-
ical dimension to the conceptualisation of ‘legitimacy’
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regarding bedside rationing. Stakeholders, e.g. patients,
proxies, other healthcare personnel and tax-paying citi-
zens in general, must also be allowed to influence the
common normative basis for deriving prioritized and ra-
tioned health care claims. As a prerequisite, the norma-
tive principles justifying individual limit-settings will
have to be publicly accessible and transparent, and op-
portunities for appeal and revisions made available for
anyone interested in doing so.
CECs’ involvement in bedside rationing
Any justified, legitimate role of CECs involved in bedside
rationing – considered as a procedural condition itself –
can now be assessed according to whether and how
these committees manage to strengthen the procedural,
epistemic and political dimensions of legitimacy pro-
duced by the decision-making processes. A recently pub-
lished paper presents an overview of potential roles
CECs can take on in bedside rationing, based on real
word examples [2]. This provides us with a very useful
starting point to identify how CECs actually can
influence bedside rationing/resource allocation. We are
interested in how these committees can do so in a nor-
matively justified manner. Therefore, we will discuss
how these approaches contribute to legitimacy in line
with the requirements for reasonable clinical priority-
and limit setting and the additive, political requirement
that stakeholders are given the opportunity to influence
the normative basis for these decisions.
An analysis of 38 Norwegian CECs’ work with ethical
problems of priority setting and resource use identified
six roles that CECs can play in handling such cases
(Table 2) [2]. We illustrate the roles with two cases
drawn from the Norwegian study.
We now present two CEC cases concerning bedside
rationing, taken from Magelssen et al. [2] and summa-
rized and adapted by the present authors.
Case 1
The hospital CEC was called on to give advice on the
care of a patient who received continuous ventilator
treatment in the home. A large care team was required,
and municipal authorities wanted the patient to move to
a nursing home to reduce costs and improve continuity
of staffing – against the patient’s own preference. A
team of CEC members went to the patient’s house to
discuss and note the opinions of the patient and spouse.
Next, the CEC held a meeting where other stakeholders,
including municipal authorities and carers and hospital
staff, came together to discuss what was perceived as a
conflict between patient autonomy and fair resource use
and justice. The CEC organised both the deliberations
and the written consultation report by a structured de-
liberation method. In the report, the CEC detailed the
information that had been presented to the committee,
and discussed the trade-off between values and princi-
ples, the role of national priority setting criteria, and
legal aspects. The committee’s advice to the municipality
was to offer future care in the nursing home only.
Table 1 Seven requirements for legitimacy of clinical decisions with priority-setting consequences. From Bærøe [10]
Requirement Explanation (conditions supported in parentheses)
1 Self-reflection Explicit reflection on applicable goals of healthcare and principles for distribution (supports condition (a))
2 Search for all relevant
arguments
Identification of context- and patient-related reasons to justify deviation from guideline (b)
3 Impartiality Recognition of impartiality (a-b)
4 Political consequences Recognition of the political consequences of the claims put forward (c)
5 Prioritised services A stable perception/justification of what kind of services the healthcare service should prioritise (c)
6 Reasonable justification Justification of claims on healthcare so that they would be acceptable to colleagues sharing this aim of
justification (d)
7 Professional self-regulation Institutionalisation of requirements 1–6 supports all four conditions (a-d) and makes the performers
accountable towards health authorities and stakeholders
Table 2 Roles and possible impact of CECs dealing with priority issues (adapted from Magelssen et al.) [2]
Role Potential impact
Analyst Clarify values/principles at stake and the impact of decisions
Advisor Solve concrete dilemmas
Moderator Contribute to fairer decision-making processes
Disseminator Create awareness and disseminate knowledge among clinicians
Coordinator Connect different levels of healthcare organization
Guardian of values and laws Ensure legitimacy and fairness in line with common values
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Case 2
A new drug had shown some effect for patients with
metastatic lung cancer. Yet cost-effectiveness was very
low with high drug costs and only modest effects. The
national decision-making body had not yet concluded
whether the drug should be covered by public funds and
offered in public hospitals. The CEC was contacted by a
physician as some patients now wanted to buy the drug
themselves and have it administered by the hospital;
how was the physician to respond? In Norway’s publicly
funded healthcare system this practice would be unpre-
cedented. There were no private clinics in the city that
would offer to administer the treatment. If the hospital
were to provide the treatment, then this would entail
substantial additional use of resources such as outpatient
visits, clinician time and attention and additional radio-
logical examinations and blood tests. The CEC consulted
several stakeholders and concluded that the principle of
equal access, fundamental to Norwegian healthcare pol-
icy, should take precedence, and that it was therefore
unacceptable that only those who were able to pay
should receive the drug in a public hospital. Although
the clinician was thankful for the CEC’s support and
clear arguments, patients were dissatisfied and protests
reached the media. The CEC’s proposed policy was later
adopted hospital-wide by the management. The CEC
also brought the dilemma to a national level, to be dis-
cussed in the National council for priority setting. A
2016 government white paper on priority setting out-
lined a similar policy, which was then adopted in parlia-
ment: when the evaluation of public coverage for new
drugs is underway, the drugs will not be administered in
public hospitals at the patient’s expense in the
meantime.
CECs as analysts
In the two cases the CECs acted as analysts. The CECs
discussed the cases together with the different stake-
holders, applying, explaining and clarifying relevant
moral principles in the process. As an analyst, the CEC
can take on the role as a dialogue partner and assist
decision-makers in structuring their reflection towards
reasonableness according to all requirements 1–6 in
Bærøe’s framework. This presupposes that CEC mem-
bers collectively possess the relevant competence in pri-
ority setting criteria and connected moral arguments
and political theory to guide accordingly. In our experi-
ence, clinicians often possess only rudimentary know-
ledge in this area. However, many CECs employ an
ethicist or philosopher who could perhaps assume spe-
cial responsibility for this body of knowledge. For CECs
to legitimately take on the role as analyst according to
the framework, some measure of this kind of compe-
tence is certainly required. At the same time, the fact
that CECs consist of several members that can contrib-
ute to enlighten more aspects of the issues than an indi-
vidual clinician may manage on their own is likely to
strengthen the epistemic dimension of reasonable justifi-
cation of the decision according to requirements 2–6. It
might matter here whether the CEC handles the case as
a full committee or whether only some CEC members
are involved in the consult. As for the political dimen-
sion of involvement of stakeholders underscored by the
framework, this dimension is not strengthened by the
CEC contributing as an analyst.
CECs as advisors
A role as advisor implies the ability of CECs to reach a
conclusion about reasonable bedside rationing. In the
two cases, applying and weighing the morally relevant
factors led the CECs to propose certain conclusions as
the ethically most appropriate courses of action. The
ability to give sound, justified advice relates to require-
ment 1–6 of Bærøe’s framework and hinges on the same
skills highlighted above that enable the CEC to analyse
the case; if not present, an advisory role cannot be legit-
imate. However, even though we may assume that the
total competence of a CEC transcends the relevant com-
petence of a clinician in illuminating a case, another
issue occurs. Granting CECs an advisory role based on
the privileged position of bringing in both disciplinary
competence and multiple individuals’ perspectives might
potentially be counter-productive. It might undermine
the individual, epistemic project of the authorised
decision-maker, the clinician, to reach fair conclusions.
It is crucial that clinicians themselves – who are carrying
the responsibility of the decisions – aim to develop
adequate reasoning to apply consistently across cases.
Reasoning together with the committee can certainly be
a useful part of such an endeavour, but leaving it to the
committee to produce advice (rather than help the clin-
ician reach a conclusion) seems to create a mismatch
between authorised discretion and responsibility. How-
ever, we find it likely that participation in CEC delibera-
tions can provide clinicians with knowledge and a
vocabulary for priority setting, thus equipping them to
make future bedside rationing decisions on a sounder
and more independent basis than before. Again, the ad-
visor role of CECs alone does not support the political
dimension of legitimacy.
CECs as moderators
In both the two cases the CECs acted as moderators by
structuring the deliberation process to give a hearing to
arguments from the involved stakeholders. In case 1, dif-
ferent healthcare services (here, municipal and hospital,
respectively) were brought together. In line with Bærøe’s
framework, CECs are expected to organise processes
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that promote fair decision-making when acting as mod-
erators. An often-invoked philosophical underpinning
for CECs is discourse ethics, with its demands that all
relevant stakeholders participate in deliberations held on
equal terms, and that the best arguments rationally eval-
uated should prevail [14, 15]. These requirements
resonate well with the framework’s demands on 2)
searching for all relevant arguments, 3) impartiality, and
6) providing reasonable justification for entitled claims
on care. Furthermore, CECs promote transparency, as
stressed by the framework, by producing detailed case
reports where conclusions are justified by arguments.
However, there are further, more specific process re-
quirements for priority setting decisions to promote fair-
ness and legitimacy. The first is that there are more
stakeholders than those that are directly involved in the
case and likely to be present in the CEC meeting (i.e. pa-
tients, next of kin, healthcare personnel and managers),
namely any other adversely affected patients, and other
patients who could benefit from the opportunity costs.
To promote impartiality (requirement 3 in the frame-
work), the CEC should take the perspectives of any
stakeholders not present into account in the delibera-
tions. In the role of moderator the CEC is facilitating
processes. For this to be a legitimate role, they must also
possess knowledge and ability to translate relevant the-
oretical and practical insights on procedural fairness
onto fuzzy, real-world conditions. This would for ex-
ample not only require that stakeholders’ concerns are
voiced, they will also have to be listened to and their
concerns addressed in ways that give stakeholders reason
to consider the conditions for the process fair [16]. In
this respect case 1 appears to showcase an asymmetry in
the CEC’s treatment of the patient and spouse on one
hand and health professionals and managers on the
other. Did the patient and spouse get to participate in
the moral dialogue proper, or did they only get to voice
their concerns? Were they allowed to contribute to and
challenge the description of the values at stake and the
definition of the ethical problem? Finally, according to
the fair, procedural conditions in the A4R framework of
Daniels and Sabin, it is crucial that stakeholders can
make appeals about the criteria that justify priority set-
ting, and arguably also when implemented in individual
decisions. Again, to support impartiality (and thus legit-
imacy), CECs would have to be open to deliberate about
potential appeals from stakeholders in the aftermath of
consultations and assist in directing claims to the correct
formal body.
CECs as disseminators
In case 1 in particular, the CEC also acted as a dissemin-
ator in contributing to raised awareness and knowledge
of priority setting principles and moral arguments. CECs
act as disseminators when they make troublesome issues
known to stakeholders and the public and when they in-
form stakeholders of institutionalised values, legal regu-
lations and cultural, normative concerns to take into
account (including the requirements set out above). In
doing this, CECs disseminate knowledge that – when
being correct and conveyed in ways that do not create
misunderstandings – can only help support legitimacy
along the three dimensions. For many CECs, in addition
to case consultation an important function is to organize
topical seminars and otherwise educate clinicians about
issues in clinical ethics [17]. Raising issues of bedside
rationing for discussion and informing about priority
setting criteria and ethical principles can be a valuable
way of creating awareness and encouraging clinician
self-reflection and discussions within the professions (as
per criteria 1 and 7 of Bærøe’s framework respectively).
CECs as coordinators
CECs can also support legitimacy by influencing the pol-
itical agenda by acting as coordinators, passing on prin-
cipled issues from the clinical level. Case 2 illustrates the
necessary interdependence between micro-, meso- and
macro-level priority setting decisions. In case 2, the CEC
raised the issue to the hospital management level, result-
ing in a hospital-wide policy which was in line with the
CEC’s advice. Later the CEC also ensured that the issue
received attention at the national level. A principled
worry here, however, is whether different CECs would
deem cases similarly as to whether the issues raised
should be brought to higher levels of the organization or
the political level. If it is left to the arbitrary judgments
of CEC members (and their values and interests) when
to do this or not, this does not support justified vertical
equity on a population level (requirements 4–5) in the
framework) and certainly not the procedural and polit-
ical dimension of legitimacy. More precisely, legitimacy
would ideally require transparent rules for when not to
lift issues up for principled discussion. This would be to
avoid that issues others want to have discussed on a
principled level are stopped by the judgments of the
members of the committee.
CECs as guardian of values and laws
Finally, the CEC can act as a guardian of values and
laws, in pointing out accepted social values and their
impact on the case at hand. In case 2, the social value of
equality of access was argued by the CEC to be particu-
larly relevant. CECs have to impose self-regulation
(according to requirement 7 of the framework) in order
to be accountable towards health authorities and stake-
holders. This involves critically assessing and justifying
the values they purport to promote. In so far as CECs at
the same time also strive for impartiality in addressing
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and scrutinizing stakeholders’ personal values – to also
critically test the established regulations and expecta-
tions – this enhances all dimensions of legitimacy. If, on
the other hand, CECs insist on narrowly understanding
new clinical issues in light of the values previous cases
have been appreciated according to, this undermines the
same dimensions of legitimacy.
Prerequisites for contributing to legitimacy
The discussion above has shown that CECs are able to
contribute to procedural, epistemic and/or political legit-
imacy to the extent that they fulfil the six roles that
CECs can play in issues of priority setting. However, the
discussion has also highlighted prerequisites for CECs
being able to fulfil these roles. These prerequisites may
be grouped into three main categories: 1) the ability to
adequately represent all stakeholders; 2) the ability to
deliberate – and critically revise this deliberation on ap-
peals – in a systematic manner that promotes impartial-
ity and reasonableness, drawing on relevant clinical,
ethical and legal arguments; and 3) transparency with re-
spect to the deliberation and conclusions.
The extent to which CECs will be able to fulfil the pre-
requisites and thus contribute to legitimacy in practice is
an interesting question which should be investigated em-
pirically. The seven requirements for legitimacy of clin-
ical decisions with priority-setting consequences and the
requirements set out in the discussion of the six roles
for the CEC could form the basis of evaluation criteria
for CEC consultations on the topic.
Conclusions
On the basis of criteria for legitimacy of clinical deci-
sions with priority-setting consequences and roles that
CECs might play in case consultations involving priority
setting issues, we have shown that CECs have the poten-
tial to increase the legitimacy of such decisions. How-
ever, there are important prerequisites that must be in
place for the CEC to contribute to legitimacy.
It seems likely that a CEC consultation will serve to
increase the overall legitimacy of the decision above
what single clinicians would achieve on their own even
though not all prerequisites are fully in place. How-
ever, there is a danger that a CEC consultation that is
flawed in respect of the prerequisites can confer a mis-
leading ‘stamp of approval’ on the deliberation process
and moral analysis. There is then a risk of bias and un-
justified solutions and decisions based on fallacious
reasoning or inadequate processes [18]. Involvement of
the CEC might then serve to decrease legitimacy of
decisions made. This is why close attention to the
workings of CECs when handling issues of bedside ra-
tioning is so crucial.
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